The Tale Of A Retailer That Grew Too Big for Its Balance Sheet

The announcement of the closure of OK Glen View broke the heart of local resident Stella Savanhu.

“It feels like watching a piece of Zimbabwe disappear,” she said. “OK was never just a shop. It was part of us.” Across the country, thousands share her pain as expressed on various social media platforms, on kombis and other interaction points.

Yet for industry analysts, OK Zimbabwe’s emotional footprint is only half the story. The other half is a hard financial truth: The 11 store closures will not be enough. Experts warn the retailer probably still needs to shut another 20-plus locations to avoid collapse.

Former Deloitte consultant Tinashe Mukogo says the problem is brutally simple:
OK Zimbabwe is operating as if it still has the liquidity of 2015 — but the game has changed.

• 2015 net working capital: +US$22 million
• March 2025 net working capital: –US$19 million
• Deterioration: US$41 million

The US$20 million raised through the rights issue has offered temporary relief, but plans to raise an additional US$10.5 million through property disposals remain incomplete.

Mukogo told ZimNow that running 62 stores under those conditions is tough and a sustainable footprint is closer to 40 — maybe even 30.

His assessment echoes internal modelling done during the rights issue period, which concluded that a smaller, better-stocked network would outperform a sprawling, underfunded one.

When Shelves Thin, It’s the Economy Talking

Fintech and data specialist Jabulani Simplisio Chibaya frames OK’s collapse within a wider national story: He points to tighter liquidity, the volatility of the ZWG and a rapidly expanding informal sector where overheads are lower and US dollar pricing flexible

For many consumers, the choice is no longer sentimental — it’s survival-based.

Zimbabwe’s informal retailers have perfected flexible USD pricing, faster stock turnover, cheaper rentals, lower staffing costs and zero formality friction

For an average urban shopper, the choice is obvious: Buy where it’s cheaper and always available. That shift has eaten into formal retail volumes at a scale the sector has not seen since dollarisation.

Financial analyst Manatsa Mazoe says legacy brands like OK Zimbabwe, TM Pick n Pay, Spar and N. Richards can no longer depend on nostalgia by Zimbabweans like Stella Savanhu when the marketplace that has fundamentally changed.

“They must move from survival mode to strategic offence,” Mazoe argued.

His three-point prescription includes digital integration which encompasses real-time inventory, dual-currency pricing clarity and data-driven promotions.

The second prescription is joining the competition that can’t be beaten through SME partnerships which bring cheaper, local supply chains and faster restocking cycles

The third point zeros in on usiness ecosystems that include alliances with fintechs, logistics players, and local manufacturers

“Retail contributes 19% to GDP. The sector is too important to fail — but it will take boldness to save it (OK Zimbabwe),” said Mazoe.

The Numbers Behind the Crisis

OK’s audited results for the year ending March 2025 reveal the scale of the bleeding:

• Revenue down 52% to US$245 million
• US$25 million loss
• US$10.3 million in impairments
• CapEx frozen at US$0.9 million
• Suppliers demanding cash upfront
• Power cuts pushing fuel & maintenance costs higher

These pressures choked stock availability — and with empty shelves came disappearing foot traffic.

Leadership Overhaul & the Search for Cash

In February 2025, the company recalled veterans Willard Zireva (CEO) and Alex Siyavora (CFO) to steady the ship.

The current turnaround plan includes:

• 11 store closures
• sale-and-leaseback of properties worth US$10.5 million
• head-office expenditure cuts
• a staff retraining programme after heavy skills loss

Stores on the disposal list include:

OK Mbuya Nehanda (US$3.21m)

OK Glen View (US$1.83m)

Birmingham Warehouse (US$3.7m)

OK Gweru (US$2.7m)

OK Malvern (US$1.42m)

Multiple Harare stands including Borrowdale (US$6m)

But analysts warn the math still doesn’t add up — not without a slimmer footprint.

Where the Turnaround Will Be Won or Lost

Across interviews with economists, analysts and former executives, ZNyaya found rare consensus:

OK Zimbabwe’s survival depends on closing all unprofitable stores, rebuilding working capital, allowing more branch autonomy in procurement, digitising operations and forging stronger local supply pipelines.

Some insiders fear that if OK delays the next phase of restructuring, it may lose supplier confidence permanently — a death sentence in retail.

One reader said that OK Zimbabwe leadership should value pragmatism and sharp business acumen to match sentiment of the many Zimbabweans who do not want to see the chain fail.

“It all boils down to whether one can walk into OK and buy what they want at a competitive price. It’s that simple,” she said.